Governance Model and Voting System

I read that to mean any proposal that utilizes the governance system to achieve a result, not only to change the governance system. For example, to activate the fee switch or change the reward from the pools, after all those are the examples right above that part on the litepaper.

The governance model wasn’t proposed by the community, it was definded on the litepaper. Who bought PNG bought on the expectation that this was going to be the voting model. So I believe that any change to that model, especially one that takes away power from the PNG holders should be voted based on that model. Anything different would be a MAJOR break of trust.

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Breach of trust in whom? This is a community driven platform. You, I and everyone else here has to work together to make Pangolin a success.

Breach of trust on the agreed contract AKA litepaper. It is not that we don’t already have rules.
When you, I and everybody else bought PNG, it was based on a trust on the litepaper and smart contract code. I am 100% in favor of whathever voting scheme, as long that voting scheme is aproved using the lite paper scheme.
Alternatively, I would also be in favor of any voting scheme that achieves consensus between all PNG holders.
What I would not be in favor is any voting scheme that goes against what the majority votes, considering majority being what is defined on the litepaper.

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Lite-paper says, its going to be “weighted” if you read the topic from the start it’s already mentioned on the second message.
If you do not get it, you may continue typing pointless without adding anything to this topic.
You may basically say I support 1png =1vote if you support that one.
In this case governance (all PNG holders) needs to consider how to protect proposals from whales.
Considering current distribution only top 10 account is able to reach >%50 of the voting power considering 1png=1vote (means if a whale has holding 1M PNG that account able to vote 1M vote), are you OK to be in that type of governance model?
If OK, than I have no more to say, If not, what is your idea to mitigate whale power from other holders?

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Sorry for interrupting, and big HI to everybody here.
I have been following this tread for some time and something stirred a possibly new
idea regarding governance model. As is evident from mother nature, it’s impossible
having just whales and sharks swim around, but it implies we can’t have just whitebait
voting on the future of project. All the pilchards out there including myself are dreaming
of becoming a whale one day, on the other end as whales get bigger they need more and more food just to sustain. Thinking of that gave me idea about issuing nontransferable and not tradable NFT’s that would yield more voting power to early
adopters of png (unlike myself). In other words it could create environment that benefits believers but attracts big investors.


Yes, it is weighted. As per litepaper “votes weighted by delegated PNG”. That means that if 1 vote has 1 PNG delegated to it: 1 x 1 = 1. If 1 vote has 10 PNG delegated to it: 1 x 10 = 10. Weighted is not a undefined mathematical construct, it has a very specific meaning actually.
As in Weighted arithmetic mean - Wikipedia.

Second, I don’t think that protecting proposals against whales is a necessity. After all, if a proposal decreases value from PNG holoders, the whales will simply not have economical incentive to vote on it, they will actually vote against it. They will be the ones with most interest to vote against it, actually.

What I consider most important is how to protect the token holders from non tokens holders (or really small holders) to highjacking their value.
I really don’t get why we should protect against whales, it’s like protecting a company from it’s owner, protecting from the ones who have more interest on its future and growth.

Nontrasferable funds have a problem: what if I decide to change my wallet?
Remember, on the blockchain we don’t have information to identify someone, just the wallets. There is no way to differentiate a huge whale from a million small investors who trust the same friend to keep their keys, in the same way that it’s not possible to differentiate a million small investors from a whale with a million wallets…

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I really like this proposal, but in order to avoid zerging from addresses with 1 PNG, I think we need some sort of Proof of Commitment to let people start voting. DODO has an interesting mechanism that rewards long term holding for governance as well as some other benefits (will expand on a proposal to mimick some of their ideas in other thread). Basically, you can mint a non-transferable token called vDODO from 100 DODO. Requiring people to deposit 50 or 100 PNG to the Treasury before being able to partake in votes and then ensuring that getting out of this hypothetical vPNG token incurs a loss (you only get half of your tokens back, for example) would be interesting.


hello, people have some really good ideas here, now we need to act, meet on the pangolin snapshot

This snapshot is just created by developers of this project. Snapshot

One thing everyone needs to take note of is that Snapshot won’t accept votes for PNG locked in Liquidity Pools.

So to vote you’d need to withdraw your Liquidity, vote and then reenter the LP.

Time-weighted PNG pool voting!? I agree and this is a great idea on how to promote more of fair voting system. What is the disadvantage to this approach? I cannot think of any and only positives. It will provide stability and reduce whale influence on the vote.

They could have an incentive to destroy Pangolin if this is a competing project. They could be making profit now and then put the nail in the coffin after they make X amount of profit. That is why the Time weighted idea I think is an excellent idea.

The summary of quadratic summary be like below;

1- Setting min cap for PNG holdings (30 PNG)
2-Time-lock PNGs to eligible to vote (a month at least) both on staking and liquidity mining on PNG pools.
3-Giving x2 voting power for PNG pools per PNG mining liquidity (Time-locked same as above)

After having all voting eligible for each account PNG (vPNG) amount defined, considering the constraints above.

vPNG = N after simplification of first constraint min requirement (30 PNG in this case)

svPNG = N/30 than finding out QV power of each eligible account √(N/30)

To find out >%50 Cumulative QV power of all accounts divided to 2 plus 1

((√N1/30 +√N2/30 +…+√N100/30+…+√N100000/30)/2)+1

by fully obeying to submit governance proposal all below terms may applied, but to reach >%50 quorum quadratic weighting applies as “majority”

  • 10% of PNG circulating supply (delegated) to submit a governance proposal
  • During a voting period, a simple majority (>50%) of ‘yes’ votes weighted by delegated PNG that totals at least 15% of the circulating supply of PNG is required to reach quorum
  • 7 day voting period
  • 2 day timelock delay on execution

I believe time weighted voting almost same effect as minimum duration (time-locks) and it eliminates speculators (coin flippers) from equation.


I couldn’t understand this. In order to be able to vote, are we expected to make our loses permanent by withdrawing our liquidity?
In the telegram group @zeroDEXmachina have answered this question “Dex, do you know yet if the PNG inside of liquidity pools will count as ‘delegated’ PNG and count toward governance?” as “Yes, this is part of why it will take a little bit to enable governance. Otherwise we’d go live sooner.”

Could you please advise if this is the case or not?

I can’t comment for that individual, but as of today, if you go onto Snapshot to vote you can only use PNG to vote and not your Liquidity Pools (PGL).

That Zero individual has said a lot of things which are contrary to what I’m hearing, so I’d be interested to hear what his affiliation is with Ava Labs. Having the name of a competing DEX in your handle, doesn’t imbue me with a lot of confidence.

Hey all, although governance technique is already put forth in the whitepaper, thats not to say the community could vote to change it later. I saw a paper analyzing governance in Quickswap which you might find interesting

He had that name from the beginning and then some weeks later the zerodex came out, it has nothing to do with those guys :joy:

Ah ok, fair enough. Thanks for clarifying :slight_smile:

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Hello everyone,

I am following the topic from the beginning. I would like to thank you all for your time and efforts. Here are my two cents:

We are all disturbed by the behaviour of some huge PNG holders. Some of them have been so far malicious. We want to prevent any possible attacks that might hurt Pangolin in the future. Our community is not against whales. We just want to protect our DEX.

On the other hand we also want to help and protect small investors who believe in this project, while sustaining a functioning democracy.

I guess we need to think slightly out of the box to address the issues. Combining these two aspects I would like to suggest:

Dynamic time-weighted quadratic voting. This will result in every PNG being valuable as much as they contribute to the community.


  • There will be no minimum cap (or a very small amount if really necessary) per address to be able to vote, hence every PNG holder is motivated to contribute and yet not able to fully manipulate

  • Sudden transactions for possible manipulations will be fully eliminated

  • It will create less volatility

  • There will be no restrictions on staking/pooling. Free to withdraw/claim anytime.

This is the basic formula:

The voting power will be based on the quadratic value of total number of PNGs an account has and will be multiplied by the number of days (per day the multiplier will increase 0.001) it holds the PNG.

For example:

Account #1

Holds 64 PNGs for a day.

√64 * 0.001 = 0.008 voting power

Account #2

Holds 64 PNGs for a year

√64 * 0.365 = 2.92 voting power

Account #3

Holds 1,000,000 PNGs for a day

√1,000,000 * 0.001 = 1 voting power

Account #4

Holds 1,000,000 PNGs for a year

√1,000,000 * 0.365 = 365 voting power

Ceteris paribus, a whale has much more power as it should have and yet cannot dominate the decisions. Small investors are protected as long as they contribute to the community by keeping their PNGs.

In a perfect setting, airdrop PNGs should be eliminated from voting power but I do not think it is technically possible.

For liquidity pools, multipliers can be adjusted. AVAX-PNG pool contributors can get three times more, other PNG pool contributors get two times more.

I tried to address all the issues mentioned above in the discussions. Feel free to modify as much as needed.

Keep up the good work everyone.


I would like to suggest we use an equation like this to help with fair voting, it can be used alongside other ideas here:

Take a look at the proposal and make comments :smiley: